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I. Introduction
I will begin my talk with James Peck. James Peck is not only
an important figure in American history and the history of the
Civil Rights Movement, but he is also an important figure in
corporate governance history and the history of shareholder
activism. James Peck, who attended Harvard but never
∗ Alexander Hamilton Professor of Business Law, Founder and Director,
Corporate Governance Initiative, George Washington University Law School.
Special thanks to Professor Sarah Haan and the participants in the Civil Rights
and Shareholder Activism Symposium at Washington and Lee University School
of Law for their comments and insights as well as the student editors and
members of the Washington and Lee University Law Review, particularly
George Liang and Kyle Hess, for their editorial assistance. All errors, of course,
are mine.
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graduated, is the only person to have participated in the 1947
Journey of Reconciliation as well as the 1961 Freedom Rides. 1
The April 1947 Journey of Reconciliation was a form of activism
designed to challenge segregation on interstate buses. 2 The
Journey involved a two-week trip with sixteen men (eight black
and eight white) who rode on buses throughout southern states in
the United States. 3 During the Journey, either blacks sat in the
front of the bus while whites sat in the back, or the two groups
sat side by side. 4 Although the seating arrangement violated
state law in the South, which mandated segregation, 5 such
integrated seating had been declared constitutional and thus
lawful by a recent 1946 Supreme Court decision declaring
segregation in interstate travel an unconstitutional burden on
commerce. 6 During the Journey, Peck was attacked by an angry
white mob, and left with bruises, none of which required
stitches. 7 The attack did not dissuade Peck from his activism. In
May 1961, Peck participated in the Freedom Rides, another bus
journey, believed to have been inspired by the Journey of
1. See ROBERT HARRIS, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO AFRICAN AMERICAN
HISTORY SINCE 1939 362 (2006) (“[Peck] is the only person to have participated
in both the 1961 Freedom Rides and the 1947 Journey of Reconciliation, when
he was also attacked by racist whites.”); see also DEREK CATSAM, FREEDOM’S
MAIN LINE: THE JOURNEY OF RECONCILIATION AND THE FREEDOM RIDES 74 (2009)
(listing the white participants of the Freedom Rides).
2. See CATSAM, supra note 1, at 13 (stating that the purpose of the
Journey of Reconciliation was to test the application of the Supreme Court
decision in Morgan v. Virginia outlawing Jim Crow seating for interstate
passengers).
3. See id. (“The Journey originated in Washington, D.C., and carried
through Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and back through
Virginia before returning to Washington.”).
4. See id. (stating that the seating arrangement violated Jim Crow laws,
which required blacks and whites to sit separately).
5. See, e.g., Frances L. Edwards & Grayson B. Thompson, The Legal
Creation of Raced Space: The Subtle and Ongoing Discrimination Created
Through Jim Crow Laws, 12 BERKELEY J. OF AFRICAN-AM. L. & POL’Y 145, 151
n.23 (2010) (noting that Alabama segregated “buses, trains, restaurants, pools,
billiard rooms and toilet facilities” well into the 1960s, while theaters, telephone
booths, and circus events were segregated in Virginia, Oklahoma, and
Louisiana, respectively).
6. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (holding that Virginia
state law enforcing segregation on busing was unconstitutional).
7. See CATSAM, supra note 1, at 29–30 (“When James Peck . . . left the bus
to post bail . . . a large man . . . smashed him in the head with his fist . . . .”).
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Reconciliation. 8 Like the participants in the Journey, Freedom
Riders—as the bus riders became known—rode on buses
throughout the South with whites in the back and blacks in the
front or blacks and whites seated side by side. 9 And like the
Journey, such a seating arrangement violated state laws but had
been sanctioned by federal law. 10 Not only had the Interstate
Commerce Commission explicitly concluded in 1955 that
segregated busing on the interstate was unlawful, 11 but in 1960
the Supreme Court, essentially for the second time, also declared
segregated busing in interstate travel illegal. 12
Thus for his second time, and as the only holdover from the
Journey, Peck participated in a bus journey aimed at forcing
southern states and their businesses to comply with federal law. 13
The first Freedom Ride began on May 4, 1961 and lasted for more
than seven months. 14 Two buses began the journey, which started
8. See id. at 151 (explaining that James Peck, and other Freedom Riders,
expected violence because of Peck’s previous experience with the Journey of
Reconciliation).
9. See id. (explaining that at least one Freedom Rider sat in a manner
that did not violate state law so that individual could avoid any potential arrest,
and thus help the other Freedom Riders if they were jailed).
10. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 3–22 (Supp. 1925).
11. See Sarah Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 64 M.C.C. 769 (1955) (banning
segregation of passengers on buses that are traveling across state lines);
NAACP v. St. Louis-Santa Fe Ry. Co., 297 I.C.C. 335, 347–48 (1955) (holding
that law which makes it unlawful for a rail carrier to discriminate for any
reason extends to waiting rooms and lunch rooms).
12. See Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 463 (1960) (overturning the
conviction of a black law student for sitting in a restaurant at a “whites only”
bus terminal; holding that racial segregation in public transportation was illegal
and that the federal government had the power to ban such segregation for the
entire busing industry because of its impact on interstate commerce).
13. See Susan Eckelmann, Freedom Rides, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALA. (July 24,
2008), http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1605 (last updated Aug.
27, 2018) (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (“They aimed to test the enforcement of
the 1960 Supreme Court Bruce Boynton v. Virginia ruling that required
desegregation of interstate bus seating and terminal facilities.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See id. (stating that the Congress of Racial Equality organized the
Freedom Rides, and that the Freedom Rides were modeled after the Journey of
Reconciliation). The Freedom Rides pressured the Interstate Commerce
Commission to finally enforce its 1955 decision declaring segregated busing
illegal and hence led directly to regulations that dismantled segregation in
public transportation. Id.
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in Washington, D.C. and were to travel through Georgia,
Alabama, and Mississippi and end in Louisiana. 15 The first bus to
depart from Washington, D.C. was a Greyhound Corporation
(“Greyhound”) bus, which never completed the journey. 16 On
Mother’s Day, May 14, 1961, a mob of Klansmen bombed the
Greyhound bus when it arrived in Alabama. 17 Pictures of the
Greyhound bus—bombed and on fire—were splashed across the
nation and have now become an iconic symbol of the violence with
which some were willing to resist desegregation. 18 Peck boarded
the second bus—a Trailways bus. 19 The Trailways bus pulled into
the Greyhound bus terminal in Alabama an hour after Klansmen
had burned the Greyhound bus. 20 The Trailways bus was met by
a group of whites and Klansmen who proceeded to beat Peck and
the other Freedom Riders. 21 That beating did not stop Peck and
his fellow bus riders. After receiving stitches, Peck and the other
Freedom Riders got back on the bus and continued their journey
through Alabama. 22 In Birmingham, Alabama, the bus was met
by police commissioner Bull Connor and yet another crowd of
Klansmen. 23 Peck and others on the bus were severely beaten
15. See Eckelmann, supra note 13 (explaining that the Freedom Riders’
purpose was to force the federal government to intervene); CATSAM, supra note
1, at 69–70 (describing the proposed itinerary).
16. See Eckelmann, supra note 13 (clarifying that the Greyhound never
completed the journey because the mob of Klansmen burned down the bus).
17. See id. (stating that despite a warning of future attacks in Alabama,
the Greyhound bus continued on its path).
18. See CATSAM, supra note 1, at 151–54 (“The picture of the immolated
bus, snapped by an intrepid local freelance news photographer on the scene, Joe
Postiglione, would become iconic, one of the most famous pictures in American
history.”).
19. See id. at 157 (stating that James Peck became a victim and was beaten
when he tried to stop the attack).
20. See Eckelmann, supra note 13 (noting that the Trailways bus was
greeted by a smaller mob).
21. See CATSAM, supra note 1, at 156–57 (“Peck received several punches
and kicks and blows with Coke bottles and soon found himself facedown on the
bus floor with someone on top of him.”).
22. See id. at 167 (stating that after eight hours in the hospital, James
Peck called the bus driver to pick him up).
23. See Eckelmann, supra note 13 (stating that Bull Connor had informed
Klansmen that he would delay arrival of the police so that the Klan could attack
the riders).
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with baseball bats, iron pipes, and bicycle chains. 24 They were
taken to the hospital, but refused treatment because it was a
segregated hospital. 25 When he finally received treatment, it was
fifty stitches to a head wound for Peck. 26 Peck’s participation in
the 1951 Freedom Rides gained him a certain level of notoriety.
Part of that notoriety stemmed from the fact that Peck was white,
and in fact, it was later discovered that Klansmen had singled out
white Freedom Riders for especially vicious beatings. 27 Like the
bus burning, pictures of a beaten Peck and his fellow Freedom
Riders were splashed across newspapers and televisions. 28 With
those pictures, Peck gained notoriety for being a white Civil
Rights Hero—and that he was. 29 A Civil Rights Hero—regardless
of whether he was white or black.
Alas, this engagement with the Greyhound bus system was
not Peck’s first. Ten years earlier, in 1951, Peck was involved in
another act of activism with Greyhound and its bus system. 30 In
fact, it was 68 years ago, February 13, 1951, when Greyhound
sent a letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
informing the SEC of its intention to exclude Peck’s shareholder
proposal from the proxy statement related to Greyhound’s
upcoming annual shareholders meeting. 31 The proposal
24. See Peter Carlson, Ex-Freedom Rider James Peck Finds a New Villain
Behind His Savage 1961 Beating—the FBI, PEOPLE MAG. (Jan. 24, 1983, 12:00
PM),
https://people.com/archive/ex-freedom-rider-james-peck-finds-a-newvillain-behind-his-savage-1961-beating-the-f-b-i-vol-19-no-3/ (last visited Sept.
12, 2019) (describing the savage beating of Peck) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
25. See CATSAM, supra note 1, at 161 (“Birmingham was as segregated as
ever as the city prepared its welcome for the Freedom Riders.”).
26. See id. at 167 (“His six largest gashes required fifty-three stiches, he
had lost several teeth, and he was covered with bruises.”).
27. See id. at 166 (“Once against the worse beating of a Freedom Rider was
reserved not for a black passenger . . . but rather for a white man seen as a
traitor in the South.”).
28. See id. at 169–70 (listing different media outlets’ responses to the
Freedom Rides).
29. See id. at 188–89 (stating that James Peck, after the Freedom Rides,
was the “bravest man in the world” and that Peck inspired students all across
America to fight for civil rights).
30. See Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(involving Peck’s suit against Greyhound for allegedly violating the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
31. See id. (“It appears that by letter dated February 13, 1951, the
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submitted by Peck was straightforward: “A Recommendation that
Management Consider the Advisability of Abolishing the
Segregated Seating System in the South.” 32 It is certainly worth
noting that Peck submitted this proposal after the Journey of
Reconciliation, and thus after the U.S. Supreme Court had found
such a segregated seating system to be unconstitutional. 33
Greyhound indicated that it intended to exclude Peck’s
proposal from its proxy statement because the proposal was “not
a proper subject” for shareholder action. 34 The Assistant Director
of Corporate Finance at the SEC agreed, noting that while the
subject (busing) clearly related to Greyhound’s business, in his
view, it was also clear that the shareholder (Peck) was interested
in “advancing a cause” and as a result the proposal was deemed
not a proper subject. 35
Peck then went to the courts and sought a temporary
injunction to delay the annual meeting and to give him time to
get the proposal on the proxy statement. 36 In refusing Peck’s
efforts to temporarily enjoin the meeting, a District Court relied
on administrative procedure issues to effectively sanction
Greyhound’s actions. 37 In so doing, the court indicated that it was
defendant corporation wrote the Securities Exchange Commission advising it of
Plaintiff’s request and informing it that Defendant did not intend to include
Plaintiff’s proposal in its proxy statement or form of proxy for the meeting of
stockholders . . . .”).
32. Id. Peck submitted the proposal in a letter dated October 23, 1950. Id.
33. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (stating that a
Virginia statute segregating races on commercial interstate buses is invalid).
34. See Peck, 97 F. Supp. at 680 (referencing Rule X-14A-8(a) of the proxy
regulations cited by the defendant corporation).
35. See Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of
Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1555–56 (2006) (“[T]he
SEC advised the Greyhound Corporation that it could omit the proposal because
it involved ‘matters which are of a general political, social or economic
nature’ . . . .”).
36. See Peck, 97 F. Supp. at 680 (“The prayer for relief . . . asks that the
defendant be enjoined from soliciting or obtaining proxies by means of letter or
other matter . . . unless [his] proposal is included in the proxy material and on
the agenda of the meeting.”).
37. See id. at 681 (“Rules and regulations adopted by administrative
agencies pursuant to Congressional authorization are best interpreted, in the
first instance, by the agency which has been entrusted with the power and
authority to write them.”). The court gave deference to the SEC and denied the
injunction based on the fact that Peck had not pursued available administrative
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“unable to conclude that the denial of this temporary injunction
will work irreparable harm and damage to the plaintiff.” 38 I
suspect Peck and the Freedom Riders on the Greyhound bus
would disagree.
In 1952, the SEC altered the shareholder proposal rule to
exclude proposals made “primarily for the purpose of promoting
general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar
causes.” 39 The SEC did not reference Peck or otherwise
acknowledge that its actions were prompted by Peck’s proposal.
Instead, the SEC indicated that its change simply reflected a
codification of a position the SEC staff had taken in 1945. 40
Today, the shareholder proposal rule has evolved, giving way
to several amendments that now enable shareholders to submit
proposals on the proxy statement that involve significant policy
issues that transcend economic significance to the corporation. 41
Nevertheless, we continue to grapple with the underlying
corporate governance issues raised by Peck’s proposal. Those
issues center around at least two questions: First, what
constitutes proper subjects for corporate action? Second, what
should be the shareholder’s role in advancing those subjects?
My talk today seeks to answer these two questions,
particularly as they relate to the theme of this conference and the
kind of activism engaged in by shareholders such as James Peck.
Put a different way, those questions can be viewed as follows:
First, can the pursuit of social justice be a proper subject of
corporate action and behavior? My answer is yes. The for-profit
company has proven that it can deploy resources to advance
economic innovation and change. Art, music, technology, social
remedies through the SEC to obtain a revision or review of the interpretation by
the SEC’s Assistant Director. Id.
38. Id.
39. Solicitation of Proxies, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,431, 11,433 (Dec. 18, 1952).
40. See Securities and Exchange Commission, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,912, 10,995
(Sept. 27, 1946) (confirming that the intent of Rule X-14A-7 was to enable
stockholders to solicit materials related to the affairs of the corporation).
41. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security
Holders, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,997 (Dec. 3, 1976) (explaining changes to the
routine business matters rule); see also LISA M. FAIRFAX, A PRIMER ON
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 72–75 (2011) (stating that the SEC
has struggled with “determining the dividing line” between ordinary business
matters and social and political matters).
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media, the sharing economy, all of these innovations reached the
public through the for-profit corporation. 42 Why not use the vast
resources and power of the for-profit corporation to be the engine
for social innovation and change? As Larry Fink, the CEO of
BlackRock, recently noted, “society is increasingly looking to
companies, both public and private, to address pressing social
and economic issues. These issues range from protecting the
environment to retirement to gender and racial inequality, among
others.” 43 Thus, my answer regarding the proper subject of
corporate action is that what is deemed to be proper can and
should encompass more than just the pursuit of profits.
Second, what role should shareholders play? Individual
shareholders like Peck, as well as institutional shareholders
ranging from pension funds to asset managers, have
demonstrated that they are willing to play a role in helping
corporations
focus
on
more
than
short-term
profit
maximization. 44 I believe their actions are appropriate ones for
shareholders to be undertaking. More importantly, I believe that
both of my answers are aligned with a growing recognition from
multiple stakeholders in the business community that for-profit
businesses have a role to play in advancing and supporting
important social issues, 45 and that shareholders have an
important role to play in highlighting, defining, and shaping the
contours of corporate engagement around those issues. My talk
will confirm and support that recognition. In so doing, I will not
only help you understand my response to the two corporate
governance issues raised by Peck’s proposal, but also defend two
42. See Carrie Kerpen, How Has Social Media Changed Us?, FORBES (Apr.
21, 2016, 11:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carriekerpen/2016/04/21/howhas-social-media-changed-us/#166fed0f5dfc (last visited Sept. 12, 2019)
(demonstrating that social media has increasingly made our lives public) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs, Purpose and Profit,
(2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investorBLACKROCK
relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. See id. (“Purpose guides culture, provides a framework for consistent
decision-making, and, ultimately, helps sustain long-term financial returns for
the shareholders of [the] company.”).
45. See id. (arguing that public companies must take a role in leading
social change).
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principles: (1) the ability of corporations to engage in social
activism or otherwise to focus on issues related to the broader
society, and (2) the ability of shareholders to play a pivotal role in
such engagement.
My talk will have three parts. First, I will focus on that all
familiar debate about corporate purpose. In this part, I will tackle
some of the core arguments against a corporate purpose beyond
strict profit maximization. 46 Second, I will focus on shareholders
and defend their ability to engage in this space. In particular, I
will grapple with the concerns that many have raised about
increased shareholder power and the inadvisability of seeking to
rely on shareholders to advance goals beyond profit. 47 Third, I
will pinpoint some trends about which we should be mindful if we
believe that corporations can and should pursue a broader
purpose, and that shareholders can and should help corporations
engage around those pursuits. I then will offer some concluding
thoughts.
II. Revisiting the Corporate Purpose Debate
There are several reasons why people may contend that
focusing on social activism is not a “proper subject or purpose” for
the corporation. 48 I will wrestle with three of them: the primacy
of profit for the for-profit corporation, 49 the so-called “twomasters” problem, 50 and the notion that for-profit corporations
should not make value-based decisions. 51
46. Infra Part II.
47. Infra Part III.
48. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (discussing Greyhound’s
reasons for dismissing Peck’s proposal).
49. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681 (Mich. 1919)
(“The purpose of any organization under the law is earnings—profit.”).
50. See Stephen Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm, A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423,
1435–42 (1993) (explaining that a conflict between shareholders and
non-shareholders creates a “two masters” problem because “no one can serve
two masters simultaneously”).
51. See Alan Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed
Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 880 (1994) (stating that
the minimum shares ownership rule was intended to prevent shareholders from
bringing activist proposals).
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A. The Primacy of Profit

There are many who continue to cling to the notion that
corporations cannot pursue social objectives because corporations’
sole purpose must be to pursue profit on behalf of
shareholders—the so-called profit maximization norm. 52 There
are several court cases that support this norm. 53 The oft-cited
1919 case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 54 that declared that
“[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders” 55 is consistently used to support
this norm. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 56 with
its insistence that a corporation focus on maximizing value for its
shareholders once a company is up for sale, is also often cited as
confirmation of the shareholder maximization imperative. 57
Influential economists also have endorsed this imperative. For a
visible endorsement, we need look no further than the title of
Milton Freidman’s widely cited 1970 New York Times article:
“The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.” 58
While these oft-cited quotes may have rhetorical appeal,
there are several ways in which they have been questioned if not
outright debunked. 59 First, although there are admittedly many
52. See generally Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About
Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533 (2006) (introducing the concept of
shareholder primacy, wealth maximization, and corporations’ duty to religiously
pursue shareholder profit).
53. See cases cited infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
54. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
55. Id. at 684.
56. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
57. See id. at 182 (“The duty of the board has thus changed from the
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity and to the maximization of the
company’s value at a sale for the stockholder’s benefit.”).
58. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM 12 (“[T]here is one and
only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of
the game . . . .”).
59. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, A Duty to Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-arecorporations-obligations-to-shareholders/a-duty-to-shareholder-value
(last
visited Sept. 12, 2019) (voicing concerns that director discretion purportedly
directed toward shareholder wealth maximization could “just be used to
camouflage self-interest”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
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legal and extra-legal factors (including disclosure requirements)
that may pressure corporations to focus on profit and even
short-term
profit,
corporate
law
does
not
require
profit-maximization. 60 In fact, when carrying out their fiduciary
duties to act in the corporation’s best interests, courts grant
directors considerable discretion. 61 This discretion has meant
that directors not only can focus on other constituents without
breaching their fiduciary duty, but also that directors can make
decisions that prioritize the interests of other constituents over
shareholders and the pursuit of profits, particularly short-term
profits. 62 By granting directors such discretion, courts have made
clear that corporate law does not embody a profit maximization
mandate, and as a result, directors can focus on issues beyond
shareholders without violating the duty they owe to the
corporation. 63
Second, there has been a growing recognition by almost
everyone in the corporate governance community that profit
maximization is inexplicably tied to the pursuit of concerns that
focus on other constituents and the broader society. 64
see generally Steven Pearlstein, Businesses’ Focus on Maximizing Shareholder
POST
(Sept.
6,
2013),
Value
Has
Numerous
Costs,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/businesses-focus-onmaximizing-shareholder-value-has-numerous-costs/2013/09/05/bcdc664e-045f11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html?utm_term=.abd07bc8a1d2 (last visited
Sept. 12, 2019) (arguing that there is no empirical evidence that maximizing a
company’s share price makes the economy or our society better off) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. See Pearlstein, supra note 59 (“There are no statutes that put the
shareholder at the top of the corporate priority list . . . . Nor does the law
require, as many believe, that executives and directors owe a special fiduciary
duty to shareholders.”).
61. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the
Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with
Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 409, 439–40 (2002)
(arguing that constituency statutes and the business judgment rule allow
directors considerable discretion in their duty to the shareholders).
62. See id. at 440 (“[T]here is no modern case in which a court has
overturned a manager’s decision because that decision placed public interests
above shareholder interests.”).
63. See id. at 442 (using the illustration of Shlensky v. Wrigley to argue
that modern corporate case law allows directors to pay heed to the concerns of
non-shareholders).
64. See Larry Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1436 (2006) (“[M]anagers who
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Institutional investors see the link, which is why the top three
asset managers—BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard 65—have
begun making public statements designed to ensure that
corporations are making the link. 66 These groups and other
shareholders have come to recognize the link between what
happens in the economic sphere and what happens in broader
society. 67 Thus, these groups have come to acknowledge that
corporations cannot maximize profit without appropriate
attention to other stakeholders. 68 Corporations need employees to
work, they need creditors to lend, they need suppliers to supply,
they need consumers to purchase, and they need the community
to support or there will be no profits. Because corporations
operate within the confines of society they have to consider these
other groups as well as broader environmental and social
issues. 69 In other words, corporations exist in society, and thus
carefully attend to the firm’s profits must also seek at least to some extent to
further society’s interests.”).
65. See Melissa Sawyer & Marc Trevino, Review and Analysis of 2017 U.S.
Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr.
10, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/10/review-and-analysis-of2017-u-s-shareholder-activism/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (stating that these
three index fund providers own 18.5% of the S&P 500) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See Fink, supra note 43 (addressing CEOs of companies in which
BlackRock invests and discussing links between purpose and profit); see also
STREET
3
(2016),
2016
Corp.
Resp.
Rep.,
ST.
http://www.statestreet.com/content/dam/statestreet/documents/values/StateStre
et_2016_CorporateResponsiblityReport.pdf (emphasizing the importance of
creating value for clients and shareholders, engaging employees and suppliers,
and supporting communities and the environment).
67. See Fink, supra note 43 (“Companies that fulfill their purpose and
responsibilities to [non-shareholder] stakeholders reap rewards over the
long-term.”).
68. See id. (“Profits are essential if a company is to effectively serve all of
its stakeholders over time—not only shareholders, but also employees,
customers, and communities.”); see also Rob Robins, Does Corporate Social
Responsibility Increase Profits?, BUS. ETHICS MAG. (May 5, 2015), http://businessethics.com/2015/05/05/does-corporate-social-responsibility-increase-profits/ (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019) (observing that corporate citizenship can “result in higher
sales, enhance employee loyalty, and attract better personnel to the firm”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See Corporate Citizenship: Profiting from a Sustainable Business, THE
ECONOMIST,
Nov.
2008,
at
6,
http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/
Corporate_Citizens.pdf (noting that the management of a firm’s economic,
social, and environmental impacts can show visible effects on bottom
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are not immune from social forces. To continue to thrive in the
future, corporations must begin asking questions that could
impact the future. How will broader societal discussions impact
reputation? How will those discussions impact the corporation’s
ability to attract customers and suppliers? The growing
understanding that corporations have to consider these broader
issues negates the presumption that corporations must focus only
on profit.
Greyhound illustrates that these broader issues can have a
direct impact on the corporation’s business model and thus
bottom line. 70 For Greyhound, it was not simply the fact that
society was beginning to more fully embrace its commitment to
equal justice and equal treatment, but that Greyhound’s own
business model was deemed both illegal and antithetical to such
an embrace. In this regard, the failure of Greyhound corporate
officers and directors to sufficiently consider the impact of those
broader social discussions and sentiments and the manner in
which they would impact its business should be viewed by
corporate governance experts as problematic at best.
Recent events also illustrate this point. Broader concerns
about gun violence and school shootings have prompted
shareholder activism impacting various businesses. 71 Along these
same lines, sexual misconduct scandals have prompted
shareholder actions with repercussions for corporations. 72 While
these debates are contentious, the activisms aimed at
corporations (from both sides of the debates) highlight the fact
corporations are not immune from the social climate around
them.
line—revenue growth, increasing profit, and cost savings).
70. See Fink, supra note 43 (“Profits and purpose are inextricably linked.”).
71. See Shirley Westcott, Surprises from the 2018 Proxy Season, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 27, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/
06/27/surprises-from-the-2018-proxy-season/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2019)
(reporting that a group of faith-based investors were able to rally majority
shareholders—including those from BlackRock—to back a proposal attempting
to address gun violence and promote gun safety) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
72. See id. (stating that the Wynn Resorts scandal involving allegations of
sexual misconduct by the founder and former Chairman/CEO has alerted
shareholders to take preemptive measures at other corporations).
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Third, to the extent corporations have some obligation to
align their interests with those of shareholders, the clear rise in
shareholder concern around environmental and social issues
underscores the fact that corporations must focus on issues
beyond profit. 73 As history reveals, individuals like Peck have
chosen to use their influence and authority as shareholders to
highlight broader issues because they care about those issues. 74
Today, institutions with significant assets, like large public
pension funds and large asset managers, are expressing their
concerns around these issues. 75 In this regard, the growing
support within the investment community around issues beyond
profit renders any presumption that corporations must focus
exclusively on profit increasingly untenable. 76
Fourth, there is some recognition that the pursuit of profit
without regard to other issues increases the likelihood that
corporations may engage in unethical and illegal behavior. That
is why on the heels of every great corporate scandal comes the
increased pressure for better corporate citizenship. 77 This
pressure stems from a belief that providing corporate actors with

73. See, e.g., 2018 Proxy Season Review, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, July
12, 2018, at 1, https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-2018Proxy-Season-Review.pdf (reporting that environmental/social/political (ESP)
proposals gained momentum in the 2018 proxy season); HOLLY J. GREGORY,
STRATEGIC SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: PRACTICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
IN BOARD SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW INVESTOR ENVIRONMENT 3
(2018),
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/publications/nacd-governancechallenges--boardshareholder-engagement-in-the-new-inv-002.pdf (noting that
environmental, social, and governmental (ESG) change and sustainability
represent the most prevalent issues raised by shareholders seeking engagement
in 2017).
74. See Fink, supra note 43 (explaining that social activism has become
increasingly important for shareholders).
75. See Sawyer & Trevino, supra note 65 (“[I]ndex funds, public pension
funds and large activists alike place a strong emphasis on environmental, social
and governance [] parameters.”).
76. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (illustrating other
priorities among corporate directors and shareholders).
77. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of
Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 704–5 (2006)
(“During corporate misconduct, such as the recent scandals involving corporate
fraud like WorldCom, corporations feel pressured to demonstrate a commitment
to ethical values.”).
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a goal beyond profit will ensure that they act in more ethical and
beneficial ways. 78
Fifth, state incorporation law itself belies the notion that
corporations have a mandate to focus on profit. 79 What do you
need to do to become a corporation? For what purpose do you
need to organize? A review of any state incorporation statute will
reveal that those statutes do not include a profit maximization
requirement. 80 No state incorporation statute mandates that
corporations pursue or focus on profit. 81 Instead, state
incorporation statutes indicate that in order to become a for-profit
corporation the business entity must seek to engage in a lawful
business purpose. 82 The pursuit of profits is not a purpose. This
means that corporations must have some purpose beyond profit.
As Larry Fink noted, “[p]urpose is not sole pursuit of profits, but
the animating force for achieving them.” 83 Profits help support
purpose, profits result from purpose, but profits do not give the
corporation a purpose. Purpose comes from whatever business
venture is being pursued. In order to appropriately pursue that
venture, corporations need the help of the rest of the constituents
in the corporate environment. 84 Corporations that fulfill their
purpose appropriately reap profits. 85 In other words, the pursuit
of profits is not and cannot be an end in itself.
78. See id. at 692 (calling attention to the global trend of companies
adopting mission statements that de-emphasize shareholder profit and highlight
the corporation’s commitment to its constituents and the broader community).
79. See Pearlstein, supra note 59 (remarking that in most states,
corporations can be formed for “any lawful purpose”).
80. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a
Function of Statutes, Decisional Law, & Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 939, 948 (2017) (agreeing that no statutory framework regarding officer
and director management or conduct even mention—much less require—action
in a manner that maximizes shareholder wealth or compels shareholder
primacy).
81. See id. (explaining that a significant number of states have adopted
“other constituency” legislation that allows management to consider the effects
of corporate action on a variety of other non-shareholder stakeholders).
82. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2016) (“A corporation may be
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful
business or purpose . . . .”).
83. Fink, supra note 43.
84. See Heminway, supra note 80, at 948, 971 (emphasizing the importance
of considering the effects of corporate action on a variety of other stakeholders).
85. See Fink, supra note 43 (“[P]rofits and purpose are inextricably
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In this regard, while profits are undeniably an important
aspect of the for-profit corporation, not only is there nothing in
corporate law that dictates a corporate purpose focused only on
profits, but an appropriate understanding of the corporation and
its place in society reveals that such a focus would be
inappropriate, inadvisable, and undesirable.
B. The Two-Masters Conundrum
Another common objection to a corporate focus on concerns
beyond profits relates to the “two-masters” problem. 86 It is a
Biblical verse, with a corporate twist. The twist is basically that if
we tell our corporate officers and directors that they have to
pursue more than one objective—profits and something
else—chaos will reign. 87 Directors will be confused about who to
serve and whose interests to prioritize. 88 Perhaps more
importantly, the two-masters problem will undermine our ability
to hold directors accountable because directors will play
stakeholders off of one another, or otherwise will always be able
to justify their decisions by suggesting that they benefit one of a
number of groups. 89 This will prove that maxim—those who are
accountable to everyone are really accountable to no one. 90
While the corporate effort to balance competing concerns is
valid, the confusion argument does not adequately acknowledge
the reality of corporate decision-making. Indeed, the confusion
linked.”).
86. See Fairfax, supra note 61, at 433 (“[W]hile the interests of
shareholders and other groups often coincide, occasionally it is impossible for
directors to pursue the concerns of all groups.”); see also Bainbridge, supra note
50, at 1435–42 (discussing the “two masters” problem).
87. See Bainbridge, supra note 50, at 1435 (“[M]anagement occasionally
faces situations in which it is impossible to advance shareholder interest and to
protect simultaneously non-shareholders from harm.”).
88. See Fairfax, supra note 61, at 433 (“[O]ccasionally, it is impossible for
directors to pursue the concerns of all groups.”).
89. See id. (reasoning that insulating directors’ decisions even when they
have no appreciable benefit for shareholders allows managers to further their
own personal interests).
90. See FRANK E. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) (“[A] manager told to serve two
masters . . . has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.”).
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argument begs a vital question: Why are we pretending that
corporate officers and directors only focus on a single
stakeholder—the shareholders—and a single interest—profit?
The reality is that corporations engage in balancing competing
interests all the time. 91 This reality undermines the notion that
directors will experience confusion if we give them the flexibility
to consider issues other than profit. In addition, by failing to
acknowledge the reality that such balancing is already occurring,
we make this form of balancing seem like a secret that directors
and officers must hide. By failing to acknowledge this reality, we
also give credence to the idea that this form of balancing is
beyond the capabilities of officers and directors rather than a skill
around which they have historically engaged. 92
The concern with respect to accountability also misses the
point. Indeed, to the extent the ability to serve multiple interests
creates an accountability issue, such an issue already exists. This
is because directors are afforded significant flexibility to make
decisions that focus on other constituents or otherwise to make
decisions that preference the interests of other constituents, over
shareholders. 93 In this regard, the flexibility in the current
91. See Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing
Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1418 (1993)
(“[F]iduciaries of various sorts commonly find themselves pulled between
compelling duties.”); Margaret M. Blair, Boards of Directors as Mediating
Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 313 (2015) (“In a complex business
environment, directors must inevitably consider the various competing ideas
and interests at stake, and make judgment calls and tradeoffs.”); Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 281 (1999) (viewing directors as “trustees for the corporation
itself . . . mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’ competing
interests” in a fashion that keeps the productive coalition together).
92. See Blair & Stout, supra note 91, at 286 (“[O]ur claim that directors
should be viewed as disinterested trustees charged with faithfully representing
the interests . . . of all team members[] is consistent with the way many
directors have historically described their own roles.”); see also Robert J.
Samuelson, I Love Coke’s Report, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 1997),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1997/04/16/i-love-cokesreport/a590afec-44eb-4d4d-b81b-9a3c4668e54a/?utm_term=.3e34a1e383c7 (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019) (noting that the American Can Company’s 1971 annual
report emphasized management’s need to satisfy “the legitimate needs of all
three participating partners—our customers, our owners, and our employees”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
93. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (discussing the deference
afforded directors through case law and state corporation statutes).
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corporate governance regime creates an accountability problem
irrespective of whether directors choose to use that flexibility to
focus on social concerns. 94 Perhaps more importantly, the failure
to acknowledge that directors can and may be using their
flexibility to focus on issues beyond profit may undermine
accountability in at least two ways: First, allowing directors
flexibility but forcing them to deny or otherwise refuse to
acknowledge the manner in which they are actually using that
flexibility impedes accountability by making it difficult to fully
understand how and in what fashion directors are making critical
decisions. 95 Second, this situation creates a disclosure gap that
undermines accountability. The notion that the balance among
interests beyond profits is not supposed lends credence to the
notion that shareholders and the public are not entitled to
information about such interests and the balance. 96 If
shareholders and the public are not entitled to information about
certain issues and concerns, then they cannot determine how
those issues and concerns are being balanced, and hence cannot
monitor directors or otherwise hold directors accountable for the
decisions being made in this arena.
C. The Corporation Has No Values
Third, some have argued against a corporate focus on profits
by contending that corporations should not be in the business of
making value judgments. 97 This insistence encompasses at least
94. See Fairfax, supra note 61, at 433 (arguing that the large amount of
discretion that directors possess allow them to pursue self-centered objectives);
see also Blair, supra note 91, at 300 (positing that the business judgment rule
“seriously undermines . . . accountability to shareholders by virtually insulating
directors”).
95. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the
Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 419, 436 (2001)
(expressing concern over an outside observer’s ability to determine how well
directors use corporate assets and otherwise take corporate action).
96. See Palmiter, supra note 51, at 925 (stating that the minimum shares
ownership rule was intended to prevent shareholders from bringing activist
proposals); see also Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 420 (2006) (emphasizing shareholders’ very limited
right to information about the corporation’s affairs).
97. See Brands Take a Stand: When Speaking up About Controversial
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two strands: First, corporate officers and directors are ill-suited
to make decisions beyond those dealing with economic concerns
because directors and officers are selected for their business
acumen rather than for their views on social issues or their
ability to navigate the concerns associated with such issues. 98
Second, in light of the fact that people can disagree about the
appropriate resolution of social issues, some argue that it is more
appropriate for shareholders to make decisions for themselves
regarding which social causes or issues they will support. 99
Warren Buffet best expresses this idea. Buffett is a committed
philanthropist and has pledged that during his lifetime he will
give away more than 99% of his wealth to charitable causes, and
has asked other billionaires to do the same. 100 However, Buffett
has expressed serious concern with corporations’ ability to make
charitable contributions because those contributions largely
Issues Hurts or Helps Business, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2015, 9:19 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/datafreaks/2015/03/12/brands-take-a-stand-whenspeaking-up-about-controversial-issues-hurts-or-helps-business/#5d97cd09352d
(last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (“When companies engage in controversial
social-political issues they ultimately risk the loss of profits and attention of
activist groups that may result in the expenditure of additional resources . . . .”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. See Friedman, supra note 58 (stating that corporate officers and
directors have a duty to the shareholders to maximize stock value, and using
corporate funds for “a general social interest” is spending someone else’s money
rather than serving as an agent of the stockholders).
99. See, e.g., H.R. 945, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997) (seeking to amend the
Exchange Act to allow shareholders the opportunity to participate in deciding
the recipients of charitable donations); see also Dan Eberhart, Corporate
Resolutions on Social Issues Serve Activists, Not Shareholders, FORBES (June 22,
2018, 6:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daneberhart/2018/06/22/corporateresolutions-on-social-issues-serve-activists-not-shareholders/#25ac89ac743d (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019) (insisting that the aim of resolutions for change in the
way corporations are governed has increasingly shifted from securing better
returns to achieving political change) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
100. See Zack Friedman, Why Warren Buffett Just Donated $3.4 Billion,
(July
19,
2018,
8:32
AM),
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2018/07/19/warren-buffett-bill-gatescharity/#2fd223d83e36 (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (describing Buffet’s
charitable contributions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also Warren E. Buffett, My Philanthropic Pledge, THE GIVING PLEDGE,
https://givingpledge.org/Pledger.aspx?id=177 (last visited Sept. 12, 2019)
(challenging “hundreds of rich Americans” to pledge at least 50% of their wealth
to charity) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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reflect inclinations of corporate management. 101 As Buffett notes,
“[j]ust as I wouldn’t want you to implement your personal
judgments by writing checks on my bank account for charities of
your choice, I feel it inappropriate to write checks on your
corporate ‘bank account’ for charities of my choice. Your
charitable preferences are as good as mine.” 102 Thus, Buffett
created a program whereby shareholders—rather than corporate
officers and directors—could designate the recipients of
charitable contributions, though it has since been canceled. 103
The sentiment expressed by Buffett has appeal, especially when
you think about the many social issues to be supported and when
you think about the fact that many of those issues are
contestable. I believe that too often, when people consider
corporate social responsibility, they presume that corporations
will support the social issues that they find valuable and
beneficial. Today, a few groups have begun to promote issues in
the social proposal space that appears antithetical to norms of
equality and social justices. 104 This kind of promotion may
amplify concerns around allowing corporations to engage in the
pursuit of issues beyond profit. Some may raise the question: do
101. See Warren E. Buffett, Shareholder Designated Contributions,
HATHAWAY
INC.
(Oct.
14,
1981),
BERKSHIRE
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2001ar/shcontri01.html (last visited Sept.
12, 2019) (voicing his concerns that stockholder money is generally used to
implement the charitable preferences of the corporate manager, who is “usually
heavily influenced by specific social pressures on him”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
102. Id.
103. See Berkshire Hathaway Ends Shareholder Donation Plan, DESERET
NEWS (July 4, 2003), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/994328/BerkshireHathaway-ends-shareholder-donation-plan.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2019)
[hereinafter Berkshire] (reporting that Berkshire’s directors terminated the
charity contribution plan established in 1981 following “harmful criticism” of
the program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
104. See Wescott, supra note 71 (stating that the National Center for Public
Policy Research (NCPPR) has sidelined several liberal policies by taking
advantage of the SEC’s “first-to-file” rule); see also Mara Lemos Stein, Gadfly
Pushes Conservative Spin to Shareholder Resolutions, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. 15,
2018, 1:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gadfly-pushes-conservative-spinto-shareholder-resolutions-1523812814 (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (reporting
that the NCPPR is one of “a handful of right-leaning organizations” using
shareholder resolutions to sideline left-leaning investors from proxy ballots) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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we really want corporations to begin using their economic and
other resources in support of organizations that appear to
discriminate in some way? Isn’t that what could happen if we
start allowing corporations to support social causes? In other
words, there could be a troubling slippery slope in which
corporate officers and directors not only support their pet
charities, but also actively support organizations that are deemed
offensive. 105
While this concern is clearly valid, it does not negate the
benefits of allowing corporations to focus on issues beyond profits
for at least three reasons: First, because corporations are
uniquely positioned to impact important social issues, there is
significant benefit to allowing them to do so. 106 The corporation’s
sheer size and available resources means that corporations can
have a greater impact on critical issues than any single
individual could. What may be a significant amount of money for
an individual—even a billionaire—may reflect a relatively small
sum in comparison with a corporation’s total assets and
resources. 107 Because corporations have the ability to do more
than individuals, leaving the charitable giving to individuals will
inevitably mean significantly reducing the impact and benefit of
such giving.
Second, there are many decisions that individuals simply
cannot make, rendering it impossible to shift the responsibility
related to supporting social issues onto those individuals and
away from corporate officers and directors. For example,
corporate law grants directors and officers the power to make a
multitude of decisions that have significant consequences,
including environmental, economic, and social ramifications. 108
105. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 104 (citing shareholder concerns over reports
that General Electric had donated to the Clinton Foundation and Planned
Parenthood).
106. See Friedman, supra note 100 (listing billionaires that have dedicated a
large portion of their wealth to charity).
107. Compare id. (stating that 43% of Warren Buffet’s wealth is
approximately $31 billion), with AAPL Company Financials, NASDAQ,
https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/aapl/financials?query=balance-sheet
(last
updated June 28, 2019) (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (stating that Apple’s total
assets represent approximately $365 billion) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
108. See Matthew Campbell & Jacqueline Simmons, Why More Corporate
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Importantly, corporate law specifically prevents shareholders
from making such decisions. 109 Then too, corporations’ failure to
make decisions also has significant social repercussions. 110 Once
again, under corporate law, shareholders cannot compel directors
to make these kinds of decisions. In light of this reality, it is not
possible to shift the responsibility for making socially responsible
business decisions to individual shareholders in the same way
you can shift the responsibility about which organizations will
receive charitable funding and resources. The argument about
individual choice, therefore, has no force in this context.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the claim that
corporations should not make value judgments problematically
presumes that corporations are not already making value
judgments. 111 The claim presumes that currently the economic
decisions being made are separate from those associated with
values. But that is not really true. This gets me back to what the
SEC said with respect to Peck’s proposals. When the SEC
acknowledged that Peck’s proposal was related to the business,
Agendas are Reflecting Social Issues, INS. J. (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/03/02/482235.htm
(last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (reporting that 60% of consumers in the United
States say their decisions have been influenced by a company’s politics) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
109. See, e.g., Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85, 86
(1880) (concluding that the directors of a corporation manage the corporation’s
business and that shareholders cannot compel directors to take certain action).
110. See Tom Borelli, Unilever and the Failure of Corporate Social
(Mar.
15,
2017,
12:36
PM),
Responsibility,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/econostats/2017/03/15/unilever-and-the-failure-ofcorporate-social-responsibility/#3bc48813498d (last visited Sept. 12, 2019)
(discussing the “financial and public relations damage” that CEO Paul Polman
has caused company Unilever as a result of “his eagerness to put superficial feel
good policies ahead of sound business decisions”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Serving
Shareholders Doesn’t Mean Putting Profit Above All Else, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct.
12, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/serving-shareholders-doesnt-mean-puttingprofit-above-all-else (last visited Sept 12, 2019) (“[M]any of the corporate
choices, like the one to sell high-capacity guns, have social consequences that
are not limited to economics.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
111. See Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(repeating the corporation’s stance that James Peck’s proposal was
inappropriate for shareholder vote because the proposal promoted a social
cause).
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but was inappropriate because it was designed to promote a
cause, 112 it engaged in this same problematic presumption. But
doesn’t their analysis related to Peck apply with equal force to
Greyhound? If Peck was promoting a social cause of
desegregation, why wasn’t Greyhound promoting a social cause of
segregation? Is it because Greyhound’s cause reflected the status
quo? Because their cause reflected a business model? Arguably,
the message appears to be that if your values are reflected in the
status quo, they get to be characterized as a pure business or
economic decision and thus valueless; but if you push back
against the status quo, then you are advancing a cause. 113
Importantly, buried in this message is the reality that both sides
are expressing and supporting a value. In other words, corporate
actions are not value neutral. So we have to acknowledge the
reality that corporations are run by men and women; that men
and women have values; and that when men and women make
business decisions, they do not necessarily leave their values at
the door. 114 As soon as we recognize that reality, then we
appreciate that the notion that corporations should not engage in
value-based decisions is both descriptively and normatively
impossible. Corporations are already engaging in the promotion
of some social value and we need to shine a light on this fact, get
a better understanding of the values they are supporting and
repelling, and figure out what we think the appropriate set of
values should be.
Thus, none of the reasons I have articulated are sufficient to
suggest that corporations should not engage in social behavior.
Corporations do not have to focus exclusively on profit and to do
so would likely undermine their ability to be sustainable in the
long-run. 115 Corporations are already balancing competing
112. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing how Peck’s
proposal was not a proper subject for shareholder action).
113. See How Corporations Turned into Political Beasts, BUS. INSIDER (Apr.
25, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-corporations-turnedinto-political-beasts-2015-4 (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (“To the extent that
large corporations benefit from the status quo, a hard-to-change status quo
benefits large corporations.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
114. See Buffett, supra note 101 (acknowledging that shareholders and
corporate directors do not necessarily have the same social values).
115. See Fink, supra note 43 (explaining the link between long-term profits
and social activism).
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interests so it is not a good argument to suggest that they cannot
be given the flexibility to do something they are already doing. 116
Corporations also do not make value neutral decisions, so once
again it is not a good argument to suggest we would be doing
something “new” and “radical” if we allowed corporations to make
decisions with social and environmental repercussions. 117
III. Shareholders as Social Activists
Even as some acknowledge that corporations should serve a
social purpose at some level, many people would disagree that
shareholders should play a role in defining that purpose. 118 Lynn
Stout engaged in influential scholarship related to team
production and created a normative framework for understanding
corporate officers and directors as mediators of the many
different corporate constituents, including—but certainly not
limited to—shareholders. 119 Lynn Stout fervently believed that a
corporation can and should owe a duty to all of its corporate
stakeholders. 120 However, Stout was very much against increased
shareholder power, even referring to shareholder power as
toxic. 121 In so doing, she discussed the parade of horribles that
116. See Bainbridge, supra note 50, at 1438 (reasoning that directors are
routinely expected to make difficult decisions).
117. See Patsy Doerr, Four Ways Social Impact Will Affect Businesses in
(Jan.
14,
2019,
12:29
PM),
2019,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/patsydoerr/2019/01/14/four-ways-social-impactwill-affect-businesses-in-2019/#650a0cb66e71 (last visited Sept. 12, 2019)
(remarking that the “rallying cry” behind corporations weighing in on social and
political issues has been growing rapidly for several years) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2011 (2013) (“[C]hanges in corporate law and practice that
make boards more attentive to shareholders’ interests can prove harmful . . . .”);
see generally Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907 (2013) (illuminating the consequences of overusing
shareholder value maximization).
119. See Blair & Stout, supra note 91, at 276–87 (advocating for the
“mediating hierarchy” model).
120. See id. at 304 (explaining that granting directors discretion to favor
other constituencies will benefit shareholders’ “long-term interests”).
121. See Stout, supra note 118, at 2004 (“[I]ncreasing shareholders’
influence in public companies and driving managers to focus on share price to
the exclusion of other considerations can help shareholders by harming
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could come with increased shareholder power. 122 What does that
parade look like?
A. Don’t Take It Personal
Some insist that granting shareholders the ability to
influence corporate decision-making in this area is problematic
because of the risk that shareholders will pursue their own
personal agendas. 123 But there is an “app” for this risk. In other
words, there is already a provision of the shareholder proposal
rules that allows corporations to exclude proposals designed to
advance a personal grievance. 124 Additionally, we need to be
careful about what gets characterized as a personal grievance. An
issue should not be considered a personal grievance simply
because a shareholder may personally care about the issue or
otherwise have some personal stake in the issue. Like with Peck,
this fact on its own does not mean that the issue does not have
broader social significance or otherwise direct implications for the
corporation’s business. 125 Moreover, if an issue truly only involves
a narrow personal concern, then it is extremely unlikely that it
will garner enough support from shareholders to influence

corporate creditors.”).
122. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its
Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1169, 1178–81 (2013) (stating that average S&P 500 life expectancies and
annual returns have dropped since shareholder primacy theory took place); see
also id. at 1179 (“If the American public corporation were a species, we would
label it endangered.”).
123. See infra notes 128–130, 136 and accompanying text (discussing the
tendency of “asocial” investors to selfishly seek short-term gains at the expense
of other stakeholders).
124. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8 (2011) (providing for exclusions to proposals
that “relate[] to the redress of a personal claim or grievance against the
company or any other person” or to further a personal interest not shared by the
shareholders at large).
125. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, Shareholder Activism is on the Rise, but
Companies are Fighting Back, CNN BUS. (Jan. 31, 2019, 4:04 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/30/investing/activist-shareholders/index.html (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019) (acknowledging that while reducing greenhouse gas
emissions is a moral imperative, it’s also “better for business”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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corporate policies and practices. 126 Thus, the concern surrounding
personal pursuits should not be significant enough to prevent
shareholders from pursuing social issues beyond profit.
B. Toxic Shareholders?
Stout and others also worry that shareholders do not really
care about broader social concerns and thus will not use their
power to advance those concerns. 127 This worry certainly has
merit. There are some shareholders engaging in activism who
clearly are not interested in promoting some social good. 128 Some
shareholders’ activism can have a negative impact not only on
long-term profit, but also on other shareholders and
stakeholders. 129 These shareholders engage in actions that
undermine long-term value by focusing on policies aimed at
bolstering short-term profit at the expense of diverting resources
from research, development, and the long-term health and
sustainability of the corporation. 130 These shareholders therefore
engage in actions that could have a detrimental impact on
shareholders, other stakeholders, and the broader community.
126. See Brian Croce, Reform Request on Shareholder Resolutions Drawing a
Line in the Sand for Public Companies, Activists, PENSIONS & INVS. (Mar. 18,
2019,
1:00
AM),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20190318/PRINT/190319881/reform-requeston-shareholder-resolutions-drawing-a-line-in-the-sand-for-public-companiesactivists (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (referring to “‘zombie proposals’—those
submitted three or more times without garnering majority support”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. See Stout, supra note 118, at 2013, 2015 (suggesting that a shift to
shareholder primacy may instead lead to the exploitation of other corporate
stakeholders, rather than to the maximization of corporate and social value).
128. See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, CORNELL L. FAC.
PUBLICATIONS 2 (2013), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2311&context=facpub
(acknowledging
that
“some shareholders may not care if their companies earn profits by breaking the
law, hurting employees and consumers, or damaging the environment”).
129. See Joel Slawotsky, Hedge Fund Activism in an Age of Global
Collaboration and Financial Innovation: The Need for a Regulatory Update of
United States Disclosure Rules, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 275, 332–34 (2015)
(presenting critics’ view that shareholder activism “focuses on short-term profits
at the expense of other stakeholders”).
130. See id. at 303 (acknowledging commentators’ concerns that immediate
wealth to shareholders imposes a risk to corporate and societal interests).
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However, increasing shareholders’ power has revealed that
not all shareholders are the same and we cannot treat
shareholders as if they have uniform interests. Just as there are
shareholders who are not interested in other stakeholders and
the broader health of the corporation, there are shareholders who
do care about these issues. 131 Long-term shareholders certainly
must care about other stakeholders. 132 Diversified shareholders
are more likely to be concerned about impacts on the broader
society and market. 133
Shareholders who invest with an aim towards advancing
social concerns—often referred to as socially responsible
investors—certainly care about these other concerns. Perhaps
more importantly, like Peck, many of these shareholders have
been actively involved in the shareholder proposal process and
thus have revealed a willingness to use their power and authority
to advance issues that impact other stakeholders. 134 Hence, it is
undeniable that some shareholders do care about these issues
and are willing to engage around these issues.
While recognizing that some shareholders care, a greater
concern is that the actions of those shareholders who care will be
drowned out by those who do not care. Indeed, even Stout
acknowledges that some shareholders have advocated on behalf
of other stakeholders and in pursuit of issues beyond short-term
profit. 135 However, she and others appear to believe that those
131. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder
Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 83 (2008) (explaining that while there are
shareholders with “short-term horizons” whose interests are narrowly focused
on financial return, there are other investors who are willing to forego short
term financial gain).
132. See Ribstein, supra note 64, at 1459 (“A firm’s long-run profits may
depend significantly on satisfying the social demands of consumers, employees
and local communities.”).
133. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder
Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 584–85, 588 (2006) (contrasting these investors
with shareholders whose assets are less diversified because of heavy investment
in firm-specific human capital).
134. See Fairfax, supra note 131, at 86 (noting that when the SEC removed
the social cause exclusion in 1976, multiple shareholder groups began to use the
proposal process to advance stakeholder-oriented concerns).
135. See Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics are
Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1449 (2005)
(admitting that both empirical evidence and “casual observation” demonstrates
that money is not the only concern).
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shareholders will be crowded out by shareholders that have
agendas antithetical to the corporation’s long-term health. 136 Two
trends may ameliorate this concern: First, the growing consensus
among the investment community that there should be focus on
issues beyond profit decreases the likelihood that those issues
will not be prioritized. 137 Second, the fact that currently the
shareholders and members of the investment community who
have raised social concerns happen to be some of the largest and
most influential members of the investment community means
that those shareholders cannot be drowned out. 138 Today,
shareholders concerned about these issues include shareholders
with significant resources as well as the ability on their own to
influence the corporation and its officers and directors. 139 Thus,
not only is BlackRock the world’s largest investor, but together
with Vanguard and State Street, they own some “40% of all
136. See id. at 1451 (arguing that dissenting shareholders may prevent a
board of directors from pursuing objectives in favor of stakeholders).
137. See id. at 1449 (“The increasing popularity of social investing
demonstrates that a significant portion of the investing public would prefer to
put their money into corporations that treat their customers and employees
fairly . . . .”).
138. See Martin Lipton, BlackRock Supports Stakeholder Governance, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/18/blackrock-supports-stakeholdergovernance/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (confirming that Blackrock, one of the
largest investment management corporations, publicly rejects Milton
Friedman’s shareholder-primacy governance model) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Andrew R. Sorkin, BlackRock’s
Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk Losing Our Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/dealbook/blackrocklaurence-fink-letter.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (“[C]ompanies need to do
more than make profits—they need to contribute to society as well if they want
to receive the support of BlackRock.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
139. See Jan Fichtner, et al., These Three Firms Own Corporate America,
THE CONVERSATION (May 10, 2017, 2:14 AM), https://theconversation.com/thesethree-firms-own-corporate-america-77072 (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (stating
that the top three investment firms are individually the largest shareholders in
almost 90% of companies listed on the S&P 500) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also The Rise of BlackRock, ECONOMIST (Dec. 7, 2013),
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21591174-25-years-blackrock-hasbecome-worlds-biggest-investor-its-dominance-problem (last visited Sept. 12,
2019) (stating that Blackrock is the “single biggest shareholder” of CitiGroup,
Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Exxon Mobile, Shell, Apple, McDonald’s and
Nestle) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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publicly listed firms.” 140 Each of these entities has expressed
strong support for corporate strategies that move beyond profit,
have revealed a commitment to engage with corporations around
these strategies, and have made it clear that they expect
corporations to conform their policies accordingly. 141 Thus, even if
BlackRock does not propose shareholder proposals around these
issues or even vote in support of specific proposals, the mere fact
that BlackRock has made a statement about the importance of
social issues is significant and is likely to encourage corporations
to begin paying heed to such issues. 142 Perhaps more importantly,
such entities’ involvement means that shareholders can and will
play a pivotal role in ensuring that such issues remain a focal
point of corporate action. 143
Then too, to the extent the concern expressed by Stout and
others is basically a concern about the general propriety of
increased shareholder power—that bus has left the station.
Shareholder activism and engagement is the new normal. 144 The
shareholders about whom people are most concerned—namely
hedge funds—have the resources and incentives to influence
corporate affairs without resort to the shareholder proposal
process or any other traditional mechanism. 145 The antidote to
140. Fichtner, supra note 139.
141. See TK Kerstetter, A Sense of Purpose: Trends in Shareholder
Engagement, CORP. BOARD MEMBER (2018), https://boardmember.com/a-sense-ofpurpose-trends-in-shareholder-engagement/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (“Not
only are investors pushing boards to think more strategically about ESG,
diversity, and long-term sustainable investment, they’re also pushing more
shareholder communication around these topics.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
142. See Sorkin, supra note 138 (stating that BlackRock CEO Larry Fink
has threatened all corporations to pursue social good or risk losing out on large
investment funds’ support).
143. See id. (adding that Fink has pledged to hold companies accountable
and to monitor corporate response to pressing social issues).
144. See Director Essentials: Preparing the Board for Shareholder Activism
Executive Summary, NAT’L ASS’N CORP. DIRECTORS (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://www.nacdonline.org/insights/publications.cfm?ItemNumber=62968 (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019) (describing year-round shareholder activism as the “new
norm in the American boardroom”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
145. See Fichtner, supra note 139 (pointing out that the top three hedge
funds own about 90% of the voting power available in total for all publicly held
corporations).
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their activism, therefore, is not to alter that process. Instead,
corporations need to reach out to other shareholders and build
bridges with them. 146 And in fact, there appears to be a growing
recognition by corporations and their advisors that one of the
ways to counteract problematic shareholders is through
shareholders with concerns broader than short-term profit
maximization. 147 This means that increased shareholder power
makes it more important than ever that corporations actually
engage those shareholders concerned about other constituents
and long-term sustainability. Corporations need such
shareholders to be a part of the conversation and to actively
engage if they want to prevent other shareholders from
influencing the corporation in more problematic ways.
C. Cost Concerns
Some insist that allowing shareholders to engage around
these issues is too costly and too distracting. 148 To be sure, the
shareholder proposal process does involve corporate costs and
resources. 149 Corporations must craft a response to the proposals,
146. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 833 (2013) (“In this respect, shareholder engagement enables
corporations and the board to fashion policies and practices that better reflect
shareholder interests.”).
147. See Chris Ruggeri, Investor Engagement and Activist Strategies, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/19/investor-engagement-and-activistshareholder-strategies/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (“These recent trends
suggest that management should proactively engage with investors and be
prepared for activists with strong points of view.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also GREGORY, supra note 73, at 1–2 (positing that
shareholder engagement is necessary to effectively run a corporation).
148. See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Modes of Discourse in the
Corporate Law Literature: A Reply To Professor Eisenberg, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L.
107, 125 (1987) (arguing that investors with “too much control” over managerial
decision-making imposes excessive costs on the organization and permits other
shareholders to “abuse the system”).
149. But see J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, Shareholder
Proposals, and Engagement Between Managers and Owners, COLUM. L. SCH.
(May
15, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/05/15/corporategovernance-shareholder-proposals-and-engagement-between-managers-andowners/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (commenting that “[t]he actual expense of
adding a proposal to the proxy statement is ‘likely nominal’” and adds only a
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which involves time and resources. To the extent corporations
believe that the proposals should be excluded, they must engage
in a no-action process that involves additional time and costs. 150
However, opponents of shareholder engagement may have
over-emphasized the extent of the cost to public corporations. A
recent study reveals that “most public companies do not receive
any shareholder proposals.” 151 On average, 13% of Russell 3000
companies in a 13-year span—from 2004–2017—received a
shareholder proposal. 152 This translates into the average Russell
3000 company receiving a proposal once every 7.7 years. 153 “For
companies that receive a proposal, the median number of
proposals is one per year.” 154 Those are the numbers and the
reality. Then too, some of the cost is self-inflicted. While it is
certainly true that there is extra time, attention, and cost
associated with engaging in the no-action process, there are
arguably instances when engagement in that process is not
necessary and those costs are avoidable—for example, the Peck
proposal.
The argument about costs also appears to fails to consider
the long-term consequences of ignoring these kinds of
shareholder proposals and these kinds of issues. Many are not
willing to speculate about what would have happened if Peck’s
proposal had made it onto the proxy statement. But let’s
speculate. It is possible that nothing would have happened;
“modest amount of volume” since companies must draft and circulate the proxy
materials to shareholders anyways) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
150. See Patricia R. Uhlenbrock, Roll Out the Barrel: The SEC Reverses Its
Stance on Employment-Related Shareholder Proposals Under Rule
14a–8—Again, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 277, 283 (“If management wishes to exclude a
proposal from the corporation’s proxy materials, it has the burden of
demonstrating a basis . . . for excluding the proposal.”); see also id. (explaining
that management must “submit to the SEC staff six copies of the proposal, any
supporting statements of counsel, and management’s justification for leaving
the proposal out of its proxy solicitation”).
151. See JONAS KRON & BRANDON REES, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT
SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSALS
1,
https://www.cii.org/files/10_10_Shareholder_Proposal_FAQ(2).pdf (adding that
“[l]ess than half of all submitted proposals actually go to a vote”).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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shareholders would have voted it down in overwhelming numbers
and management would have been free to ignore it. And this
possibility seems very real in light of the fact that at the time, the
proposal—along with Greyhound’s actions with respect to the
proposal—received very little attention. To be sure, to the extent
this possibility is the most likely one, it makes my earlier point
that the cost of putting the proposal on the proxy statement
would have been relatively minor when viewed against the legal
and other costs associated with the corporation’s efforts to
exclude the proposal.
However, by allowing the proposal to appear on the proxy
statement, management would have had to respond and make a
statement about the propriety of its current system. Maybe that
response would have prompted a more robust conversation about
social trends and their impact on Greyhound’s business. Maybe
that response could have prompted an evaluation about how best
to respond to changes that had the potential for altering their
business model. Maybe that response could have prompted an
evaluation about how best to respond to activism directed at
buses and their role in interstate travel. Certainly the absence of
those conversations and evaluations meant that, ten years later,
the Greyhound bus—and hence its business—was featured on the
front page of every newspaper in a way that I am sure no one at
Greyhound would have wanted to happen. 155 While it is not clear
what, if anything, would have resulted from the appearance of
Peck’s proposal on the proxy statement, it also is clear that we
will never know. In addition, it seems clear that corporations
155. See, e.g., Fred Davenport, Freedom Rider Recounts Horror on
Greyhound Bus in Anniston, WVTM13, https://www.wvtm13.com/article/
freedom- rider-recounts-horror-on-greyhound-bus-in-anniston/3427729 (last
updated May 16, 2016, 12:04 AM) (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (recounting the
events of the Mother’s Day 1961 Freedom Ride attack) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Josh Moon, Witness to Freedom Riders
Attack Describes Scene, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (May 19, 2014),
https://www.montgomery advertiser.com/story/news/local/2014/05/19/witnessfreedom-riders-attack-describes-scene/9303969/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2019)
(same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Archival Photos from
the May 14, 1961 Freedom Ride Attacks in Anniston, ANNISTON STAR (Jan. 12,
2017),
https://www.annistonstar.com/archival-photos-from-the-may-freedomride-attacks-in-anniston/collection_d612321e-d928-11e6-a6c4-df0db3acf8c4.html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (containing archived pictures of the Greyhound bus
on fire) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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must do a better job of trying to consider the long-term costs of
both their actions and their inactions, and that those who push
against shareholder proposals around these issues may not be
doing sufficient work in evaluating those costs.
D. Shareholders as Canaries
Finally, it must be pointed out that the shareholder proposal
landscape has been an important platform for social issues. 156 If
you look at the history of shareholder proposals, you will see that
many of the most prominent social issues were the subject of a
shareholder proposal—busing and discrimination, apartheid,
gender equity, board diversity, and environmental concerns. 157
Not only were such issues the subject of a shareholder proposal,
but often they pre-dated the broader movement and broader
acceptance of those issues. 158 These issues started off as a push
among smaller shareholders and have now gained traction within
the broader investment community, and broader society
generally. In other words, issues that began on the margins in
the shareholder proposal arena have become mainstream,
embraced by larger segments of the investment community. 159
This highlights two important facts: One, it is important for
corporations to pay attention to developments in the shareholder
proposal space because those developments may be a strong
signal of future trends. 160 In this regard, a robust shareholder
156. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS
781 (2d ed. 2003) (confirming that public interest groups have utilized Rule
14a-8 to bring social and political issues before shareholders).
157. See, e.g., Letter from M. Hughes Bates, Special Counsel, Div. of Corp.
Fin., SEC, to Byron B. Rooney, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2019/arjunacapital04241914a8.pdf (discussing a shareholder proposal entitled “Gender Pay Equity” that
seeks to address the impact of the pay gap on the economy and the “related
impacts on stock performance and emerging public policy risks”).
158. See Fairfax, supra note 131, at 91 (“A recent examination of
shareholder activism related to social proposals suggests that shareholders play
a critical role in both prompting dialogue on stakeholder issues and eventually
legitimizing those issues so that corporate managers and other shareholders
take them seriously.”).
159. See id. (arguing that shareholder activism plays an important role in
building momentum in social movements).
160. See id. at 92 (reasoning that shareholders draw public attention to
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proposal platform is critical to corporate governance as a vital
source of information for directors and officers. 161 Two, it takes
some time for issues that appear on the shareholder proposal
landscape to ripen and gain support from the broader investment
community. 162 Hence, we should be cautious with respect to
efforts to remove these proposals in their early stages before
gaining a better understanding of whether such proposals will
actually ripen into issues embraced by broad segments of the
population.
Thus, shareholders can and should play a pivotal role in
advancing issues beyond profit. These issues are not just
personal, so that concern should not prevent shareholders’ active
engagement around these issues. More and more shareholders
have demonstrated that they care deeply about issues of social
significance because those issues impact the long-term
sustainability of the corporation. 163 In addition, such
shareholders are influential, and they cannot be drowned out.
Rather than repelling these shareholders, corporations should
step up their engagement with them because collaboration with
these shareholders may enable the corporation to better respond
to those who seek to undermine the corporation’s long-term
health and sustainability. 164
IV. What to Watch?
Finally, what to watch? There are many areas about which
we should be mindful to ensure that corporations continue to
important social issues by increasing their visibility and ultimately, their
legitimacy).
161. See id. at 91 (“[S]hareholders’ use of the proposal process prompts
corporations not only to consider social issues, but also to generate the
corporation’s position on those issues.”).
162. See Croce, supra note 126 (explaining that institutional investors must
first “analyze an issue, develop practical guidelines, and [wait] for a consensus
to emerge”).
163. See Sawyer & Trevino, supra note 65 (listing the current trends in
social activism and warning shareholder activists to focus on long-term
strategy).
164. See Fairfax, supra note 131, at 92 (encouraging management to foster
discussions with concerned shareholders regarding “the most appropriate
business solutions to the given issues raised”).
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have the flexibility to focus on issues beyond short-term profit
and that shareholders can play a role in that focus.
Since my talk has focused on shareholder proposals, I will
focus on an issue in the shareholder proposal realm—reforms
related to the shareholder proposal rule. There has always been
some effort to modify the shareholder proposal rule, or in some
instances, to completely abandon the rule. 165 Currently there are
several procedural reforms on the table that seek to alter the
ownership and resubmission thresholds. 166 We need to keep an
eye on these reforms. Changes related to the ownership or
resubmission thresholds often have the most significant
implications for social proposals because historically those
proposals were submitted by shareholders with smaller holdings
and relatively low levels of support. 167 Indeed, often such rule
changes are made for the purpose of excluding shareholders who
would advocate for social concerns. 168 Keep in mind, the price of
admission for Peck was three shares. Because of past rule
changes to ownership thresholds, Peck could not get into the
corporate meeting door today with that level of ownership. Hence,
we need to pay close attention to these changes and their
potential impact.

165. See Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal
Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 425, 426 (1984) (concluding that the costs of Rule 14a-8
significantly exceed its benefits “[b]ecause it is an unwise and unwarranted
intrusion into private transactions, private markets, and state corporation
law”).
166. See Croce, supra note 126 (“A call to action was renewed again last
month when more than 300 companies signed a N[ASDAQ] letter to the SEC
urging proxy-system reforms, including raising the resubmission thresholds.”).
167. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Shareholder Proposals, C533 ALI-ABA 1925,
1941–42 (1990) (explaining that early shareholder activism began with pioneer
activist Lewis Gilbert, a small shareholder who began challenging corporate
action in 1932).
168. See Palmiter, supra note 51, at 888 n.32 (explaining that the minimum
ownership requirement was meant “to assure that shareholders seeking to use
the process are indeed investors . . . rather than activists . . . using a share of
stock as the passkey to the proxy bullhorn”).
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V. Conclusion

We gather today during Black History Month. Thus, it seems
particularly appropriate that we discuss civil rights and that I
conclude with some words from one of the great leaders of the
Civil Rights Movement. Martin Luther King, Jr. gave a speech
towards the end of his life entitled “The Other America,” in which
he spoke about two Americas—one where “millions of people have
the milk of prosperity and the honey of equality flowing before
them,” while in the other America people search for jobs that do
not exist, live in sub-standard housing conditions, and are
deprived of adequate educational opportunities. 169 King noted
that “[p]robably the most critical problem in the other America is
the economic problem.” 170 Towards the end of the speech, King
defended his decision to talk about economic issues in response to
critics who insisted that he should stick to civil rights and not
deal with issues related to the war or jobs or the economy. 171 In
response, King stated, “I have been working too long and too
hard” against segregation “to end up at this stage of my life
segregating my moral concern. I must make it clear. For me
justice is indivisible. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere.” 172 I am sure many of you are familiar with that
quote from King, but you may not be familiar with the fact that
the quote was made in reference to economic rights and economic
justice. In his speech and in that quote, King was emphasizing
the fact that economic systems embody values, and that our
economic decisions can and need to be just. 173 King was
debunking the myth that we could separate our business
decisions from the impact of those decisions on the broader
169. Martin Luther King, Jr., The Other America 1 (Mar. 14, 1968),
https://www.gphistorical.org/mlk/mlkspeech/mlk-gp-speech.pdf.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 6
I think it would be rather absurd for me to work for integrated
schools and not be concerned about the survival of the world in which
to integrate . . . . [T]here comes a time when one must take a position
that is neither safe nor politics nor popular but he must do it because
conscience tells him it is right.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 2 (discussing the disparate economic conditions of the black
and white communities).
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economy and society. 174 King also was putting out a call to arms
to our businesses and those working with and for those
businesses and saying we must live together; we must work
together; we must pursue justice together. 175
Corporations can be just. Corporations can be equitable.
Corporations can be socially responsible. Corporations have
demonstrated over and over again that they can and will do good.
We just have to support them in that endeavor.

174. See id. at 7 (“[I]n this pluralistic, interrelated society we are all tied
together in a single garment of destiny, caught in an inescapable network of
mutuality.”).
175. See id. at 8 (“With this faith we will be able to speed up the day when
all of God’s children all over this nation—black men and white men, Jews and
Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics will be able to join hands and sing . . . .”).

